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Brief of lntervenors and Respondents 
<I,"'. TEME!\:T OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
; 11, Lkb stated in appellant's Brief are correct so far as 
'·'ml· .1 rc stated. but there are these additional facts which 
ii "i·1 ·rJrnt~ bclieYe have a bearing on this controversy. 
?1.1111w} and appellant sought and was granted compen-
·' "n f.,r the services rendered in selling the property involved 
1 
in this action. Defendants, Tom ]. Jackson :.i11d v, ~ d,I 11! i. 
by their attorney stated that: · "" · 
. "'!"he. defendants wiU stipulate the rtLtip:, . 
liquidation of the busmess will be assii..:nrd. ,, · 
(Jackson) for the_ benefit of his creditors ~\·ht, Jr't' . 
tors of the Fr?ntler Shop, either in the a(gu:;ir .. :~·· 
the me~chan~ise, the properties of the bL:.'iilt·, 
connection with the business." · 
Thereupon the Court stated: 
"The record may show that stipulation" (Tr : 
The Court then stated the stipulation of Counsel tor rht F~~: 
as he understood the same. The substance of such statemen:. 
the Court is as follows: 
"That the plaintiff may remain in possess10n of::· 
goods and merchandise of the Frontier Shop anci r· 
ceed to liquidate the merchandise on hand and holci:t:: 
same in trust, subject to the payment of the necess.ir. 
expenses of selling the same, that the surplus wo·~.: 
be subject to the payment of the balance O\\tng to:~: 
plaintiff and then pay the other creditors ratablr ·· 
At the time the stipulation was made Attorney (ox ~:: 
resented Salt Lake Hardware Company, Strevell-Patersor. C · 
pany and Acme Quality Paint Company. That defendants snt> .. 
execute a written assignment to plaintiff of the merchandise.:.: -
fixtures owned by the Frontier Shop. So far as appca:· · 
written assignment was ever made. (Tr. 4-14). 
Among the terms of the agreement between plamtitl in~' 
court below, appellant in this court, and the defendants 1 ~ ::: 
court below, respondents in this court, are the following: 
"D. In the event Jacksons fail, neglect or refuse ._ 
comply with each and all of the covenants here.: 
2 
rmJe for their ohservance that Branham may de-
d.trt· a breach of this agreement and go into pos-
,c~~1P!l ot said premises and property as in the 
11 r't 1nstJnlc and all payments made and improve-
1~1t rm placed thereon shall become the property 
ll' Branham as liquidated damages for said 
breach." 
1 h rl1c e\ent of any controversy relative to the 
uimplian((: with the terms hereof the party at 
t.iulr aprees to pay any damages suffered by the 
11111rn cnt party. including reasonable attorney fees, 
;( .1nv attorney is employed on account of such 
urntroversy. 
· r In the event of forfeiture as provided for herein 
Jacksons agree to release to Branham, or his as-
~t{~ns. :di property, leases and agreements incor-
Clirporared and referred to herein." (R. 15) . 
. \r the mJI Branham attempted to identify the merchan-
'.·'t hl' ~,i1,J to the Jacksons, but was unable to do so. He did 
Jenrif·. the rixtures. (Trs. -05-148). 
ARGUMENT 
,\i\S\XTR TO APPELLANTS POINT ONE. THE 
; R,\t'\S:\CTION WHEREBY BRANHAM TOOK BACK 
·1 Hr i\!FRCHANDISE AND FIXTURES WHICH HE 
ll!RrFORE SOLD TO JACKSONS IS SUBJECT TO 
'H !.,\ \\: OF THE BULK SALES ACT. 
i' 1 · .L 1951. Sec. 25-2-1, in part provides: 
"It '>hall be the duty of every person who shall bar-
'..:.llll for or purchase any portion of a stock of goods, 
\I ..ire~ or mtrchandise in bulk otherwise than in the 
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ordinary course of trade and in the re 1 . f h . . gu ar and .. prosecution o t e sel !er s bus mess 0 . usu, 
f h d . . ' r an entue t·-o m.erc an 1se in bulk, or any portion of the 
10
iuL, 
furniture, fixtures or equipment or suppl fp pert•. 
b ies o a hate' restaurant, arber shop or other business . d . · 1 
. h b . use in car'. mg on sue usmess, othern 1se than in th ·': 
f d b f e regu:1 course o tra e, e ore paving to the selle · 
f h . · r anv par o t e purchase pnce thereof. or deliver,nr- :. 
. . o a~ ~~ 
m1ssory note or other en<lence of indebtedness the:: 
fore, to demand and receive from such seller a , . . . rn~ 
statement m wntmg as hereinafter provided of ili: 
names and addresses of all the creditors of the sell i 
together with the amounts of the indebtedness duee'.: 
owmg by the seller to each of bis creditors and it shat' 
be the duty of the seller to furnish such statementwhi:\ 
shall be verified by oath to substantially the followmi 
effect." · 
There follows the form of the oath which provides that ti:e 
creditors to be specified in the oath are: 
"Creditors holding claims due or which will becomt 
due for or on account of goods. \\ares or merchandiic 
purchased upon credit or for the purchase price due c: 
owing by (seller) to such creditors on account of mone 
borrowed to carry on the business. whICh said good\ 
fixtures, equipment or supplies appertain.' 
It will be seen from the provis10ns of the Contract betweefi 
Branham and the Jacksons above mentioned that the Jackso:.< 
were given possession of the property and the Jacksons rn We 
of default were required to release to Branham, or his assigns 
all property, leases and agreements incorporated and referrec 
to herein. 
It is provided in U.C.A. 195 3, 60-2-2, that title to specific 
goods passes when the parties so intend. 
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UC.A. J Sl~:). 60-2-3, lays down the rules that shall be 
a lied in determining when title to goods passes. It is there w d' . . 
provided that unless a 1tterent mtent10n appears the title passes. 
"Rule 1. Where there is an unconditional contract 
to sell specified goods in a deliverable state the property 
,n the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is 
made and it 1s immaterial whether the time of payment 
or the time of delivery or both is postponed." 
The other ruies there provided for ascertaining the intention 
of the parties as well as the provisions of the contract for the 
sale of the property here involved all indicate that it was the 
intention of the parties that title should pass to the Jacksons 
at the time the contract was entered into by them and Branham. 
Moreover, it will be seen from the provisions of the Bulk Sales 
Act that the required affidavit must be given when there is a 
bargain for a sale. 
Thus Branham stood in the same position with respect to 
the duty to complv with the Bulk Sales Act as other persons 
who buy goods in bulk. There is nothing in that law which 
relieves the parties from complying with its terms merely 
because Branham had theretofore owned the property here 
involved. 
Moreover, 1t will be seen from the terms of the Contract 
between Branham and Jackson under date of July 16, 1958, 
that in case of breach Branham was entitled to go into posses-
sion of said premises and property as in the first instance and 
all payments made and improvements placed thereon shall 
become the property of Branham as liquidated damages for 
such breach. Such language does not even purport to give Bran-
5 
ham any right to the merchandise that was purchased 
. . OOc~~ 
by the Jacksons while they were m possession and operated the 
store. It will be seen that the trial court found that Br h 
. . . ~~ 
was unable to identify the merchandise which he sold to the 
Jacksons. Counsel for appellant have not and cannot successful!i 
attack such Finding. 
Counsel for appellant cite 24 Am. fur., page 352. Sec. 
204 
in support of the doctrine that the Bulk Sales Act should 0; 
given a strict construction because the same is rn derogation 
of the common law. Under the provisions of U.C.A. 195) 
68-3-2, it is provided that statutes in derogation of the common 
law shall be given a liberal construction. That is the holdmt 
of this Court in a number of cases, among them are: 
In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 Pac. 757; 
State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah 423, 226 Par. 904; 
Castle v. Delta Land & U'/ at er Co., 58 Utah 13; 1 
197 Pac. 584. 
Counsel also cite the case of Inglewood State Bank 1. Legt· 1 
man, 275 Pac. 935, in support of his contention that the Bulk 
Sales Act has no application to the facts in this case. In our 
view that case does not aid appellant. So far as appears, plaintill 
Bank in that case had not sold any merchandise or other propertY 
to defendant, and hence was not one of the parties which tht 
Act was intended to protect. There was not involved m that 
case any claims of creditors of the defendant who had supplied 
him with merchandise, nor so far as appears was any merchan· 
dise there involved that could not be identified as having been 
included in the sale which plaintiff had made and later sought 
to cancel under the terms of the contract of sale. 
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ANSWFR TO APPELANT'S POINT TWO. THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND 
DECREEING THAT BRANHAM DID NOT HA VE A 
PREFERENCE OVER OTHER CREDITORS OF JACK-
SON. 
tnder Point II of Appellant's Brief it is argued that 
because the contract of sale between plaintiff and defendants 
was recorded those who sold merchandise to defendants had 
notice of the terms of such sale. 
The law seems to be well and uniformly settled that to 
make a recorded instrument constructive notice it must be made 
so by statutory law. The common law does not so provide. It is 
said u1 45 Am. Jur., page 480, Sec. 105, that "in order to be 
effective notice to third persons it is obvious that the instrument 
recorded must be within the contemplation of the recording law 
)JOCe it is only through such laws that the record operates as 
constructive notice." Numerous cases are there cited in foot-
notes which support the text. There is nothing in our statutory 
law which lends support to the claim that those who sold 
merchandise to the Jacksons are chargeable with notice that 
anv merchan<l1se so sold might be lawfully claimed by Bran-
ham. Indeed, if such were the law, the Bulk Sales Act would 
be emasculated and the purchaser of a mercantile business on 
time would find it difficult, if not impossible, to buy other 
merchandise on credit. 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT THREE. THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
FOLLOW THE ALLEGED STIPULATION OF COUN-
SEL FOR RESPONDENTS AND INTERVENORS. 
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Under Point III of Appellant's Brief it is argued th h 
at t e 
Court was bound to give effect to the stipulation of Respo d 
n ent1 
to the effect that appellant Branham may first deduct and . 
retain 
from the receipts received from the sale of the merchandise 
here involved the amount owing to him and ther: divide the 
remainder ratably among the other creditors of the Jackson, 
The only creditors at the time the alleged stipulation \'.as madt 
that were represented by Attorney Cox were: Salt Lake Haid-
ware Company, Strevell-Paterson and Acme Quality Pa.mt Com 
pany. (Tr. 4). Obviously Attorney Cox had no authon~· ti 
enter into a binding stipulation on behalf of parties that ht 
might thereafter represent. Moreover, the law 1s well and uni-
formly settled that an attorney in the absence of express 
authority is without authority to give away the rights of his 
clients. The law in such particular is thus stated m 5 Am. fur .. 
300, Sec. 70: 
"It is a general principle that an attorney cannot b1 
virtue of his general authority as attorney bmd his die~< 
by any act which amounts to a surrender or waiver rn 
whole or in part of any substantial right of the clien. 
or do any act which will either release his client's debtoc 
or his surety or substantially jeopardize his interests 
in any way." 
To the same effect is the law announced in ' CJ.S. P 1 
Among the numerous cases cited to the foregoing texts is f on,1 
et al. v. Noble, et al., 39 Pac. (2d) 486. 3 Cal. App. (2d) 116 
Under the facts disclosed by the evidence, the Findings 01 
Fact and Judgment in this case, the alleged Stipulation is wit~­
out legal effect because appellant gave no consideration for the 
stipulation. It is suggested by appellant that he undertook to 
8 
and did oversee the sale of the merchandise. That is true, but 
he asked to be paid for such service and the Court granted him 
,, preferred claim for all that he claimed leaving no considera-
tion to support the benefits he seeks on account of the alleged 
Stipulation. 
ANSWER TO POINT FOUR OF APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF. 
The intervenors and respondents join with appellant in the 
claim that the Court below erred in Finding and Decreeing 
that Thorley Faussett and the Bank of St. George are entitled 
to share with the other creditors of Jackson in the fund here 
involved. 
As to the claim of the Bank, we direct the attention of the 
Court to the provision of the Bulk Sales Act, U.C.A. 1953, 
25-2-1, which provides for those who are to be mentioned in 
the affidavit as being those from whom money has been bor-
rowed to carry on the business. There is no evidence that the 
Bank of St. George loaned any money to the Jacksons to carry 
on the business in which they were engaged. 
CROSS APPEAL 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 74(b), the respondents 
represented by Counsel who represent respondent, Berlin Glove 
Company, et al., cross appeal from that part of the Judgment 
wherein and whereby the sum of $350.00 is allowed as attorney 
fees paid out of the fund derived from the sale of the merchan-
dise here involved, and also from that part of the Judgment 
9 
awarding to appellant the sum of $911.00 as a I)>cfc r d . 
r. e cla1rn 
for the fixtures sold out of such fund. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT A 
Appellant basis his claim for attorney fees with whKh tri 
pay his attorney on the provisions of his Contrac:t with tht 
defendant Jacksons, which provides that if a party to the con 
tract is in default in complying with the Contract. he shail bt 
liable for damages, including a reasonable attorney fee, 1f ?n 
attorney is employed on account of such controversy. (R. 111 . 
So far as appears no legal services ''ere necessary or were ptr 
formed in the process of selling the property The legal se:-virn 
having been performed solely for the benefit of appellant. there 
is no basis for, in effect, requiring defendant to pay for am part 
of such service. There is no provision in the Bulk Sales ,-\:: 
which permits one creditor to recover an attorney fee to be paid 
out of the fund derived from the sale of the property, and cer 
tainly there is nothing in the Act which gives an attornev a 
preferred claim, a part of which is to be paid by a creditor wh11 
has not agreed to pay an attorney fee. 
The Act provides that one who bargains for or purchase) 
merchandise in bulk must cause the purchase money to bear 
plied ratably, except as provided by law, to the parment ot 
claims for merchandise, furniture and fixtures on credit. and 
for money borrowed to carry on the business. If the numerous 
creditors of a failing business should hold a note or other agree 
ment for the payment of an attorney fee in the event an account 
is placed with an attorney for collection, it may be that lll 01 
10 
the JSodS would be consumed in the payment of attorney's fees 
and nothing would be left to pay creditors. The basis for 
liabiiiry to pay an attorney fee is either because of a contract 
or by provis10ns of law. The respondents here have not agreed 
to contzibure to the payment of an attorney fee to Counsel for 
olamtiff, and the Bulk Sales Act contains no such provision. 
Branham 1s a mere creditor of the Jacksons the same as the other 
creditors. Branham, the same as the intervenors, at one time 
01\ned property which they sold on credit to the Jacksons. That 
the Court erred in granting an attorney fee payable out of the 
fees here involved see Fidelity and Co. v. Monroe, 133 Md. 
270, 105 A 174. 
POINT B 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
APPELLANT A PREFERRED CLAIM IN THE SUM 
OF $911.00 ON ACCOUNT OF THE FURNITURE OR 
FIXTURES WHICH HE HAD THERETOFORE OWNED 
AND SOLD TO DEFENDANTS JACKSONS. 
At the trial of this cause plaintiff proceeded upon the 
theory that he had a right to all of the property that he had 
theretofore owned and conveyed to the Jacksons and sufficient 
of the property that the Jacksons had purchased on credit to 
pay him in full including what he owed his attorney. Appar-
ently the trial court adopted such view, but denied Branham 
a claim to the merchandise because he was unable to identify 
that portion thereof which he had theretofore owned. It is the 
contention of these respondents that the Court erred in award-
ing to Branham a preferred claim of $911.00, the value of the 
fixtures. 
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There is no language in the Bulk Saks Act whi l 
. cl gran(I 
to a creditor of a seller of an entire stock of goods any f · 
. ~~ ~laim. to that part of a stock of goods that he may be able to 
identify as bemg the goods which he solJ. Indeed if h , sue a 
construction were placed on the Act, it \\Ould lead to di en t11 
taking of evidence and in the end of ten lead to a mere . 
guess 
as to who formerly owned the various pieces of property The 
express provision of the Act is that the fund derived from rhe 
sale of the property subject to the Bulk Sales Act shali Dt 
divided ratably, except as to those claims preferred by laii. 
There is nothing in the Act which provides that fixtures used 
in the operation of a mercantile store are to be excluded from 
the Act or that the proceeds from the sale ot fixtures used 1r 
operation of a mercantile store are to be treareJ as a preferred 
claim. 
The attention of the Court is again called to those pro11· 
sions of the Act which provide that every person who shall 
bargain for or purchase any portion of a stock of goods, wares 
or merchandise in bulk or any portion of the property. fixturei 
equipment or supplies of a hotel, restaurant. barber shop 1J1 
other business used in carrying on such business. 
We are mindful of the rule that when special langua~t 
is used to describe property followed by general languagt. ;ucr, 
general language is limited in its application to property similar 
to that described. The form of the affidavit shows that sul~ 
rule has no application here, in that, the affidavit makes no dis 
tinction between money owing for merchandise. fixtures, equ:p 1 
ment, service performed and money borrowed to cam on the 
business. The furniture and fixtures were as much a part of the 
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business as was the merchandise. It was sold by Branham to 
the Jacksons on credit and taken back by Branham and sold 
the same as was the merchandise. That being so, Branham is 
not entitled to a preferred claim for the value of the fixtures. 
Such is the holding in the case of N. Sakelos and Co. v. Hutchin-
son Bros. 129 Md. 3?~~' 99 A 357, Berger v. Berger, 271 Wis. 
292; 73 NW. 2nd 't;4:;'Parkham v. Thompson Co., 127 Ga. 306 
56 SE 460. 
The Judgment should be affirmed with the modification 
herein urged. 
LeROY COX 
60 N. Main Street 
St. George, Utah 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for lntervenors 
and Respondents 
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